

# EXHIBIT A

U.S. Department of Justice  
Drug Enforcement Administration

## REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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1. Program Code [REDACTED]	2. Cross File [REDACTED]	3. File No. [REDACTED]	4. G-DEP Identifier [REDACTED]
5. By: S/A John Archer At SOD/BIU	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> [REDACTED] <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> [REDACTED] <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> [REDACTED] <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	6. File Title AL KASSAR, Monzer	
7. <input type="checkbox"/> Closed <input type="checkbox"/> Requested Action Completed <input type="checkbox"/> Action Requested By:		8. Date Prepared 10/18/07	
9. Other Officers: S/A William S. Brown, G/S Louis J. Milione, G/S Brian Dodd and I/A Radi Barkett.			
10. Report Re: Post-Arrest Interview of Tareq AL GHAZI on 10-16-07.			

DETAILS

- Reference DEA-6 by S/A Brown dated 10-18-07 under [REDACTED] Re: Acquisition of N-100 thru N-103 from Romanian Authorities During Extradition of Tareq AL GHAZI and Felipe MORENO-Godoy on October 16, 2007.
- Reference DEA-6 by S/A Archer dated 10-18-07 under [REDACTED] Re: Arrest and Extradition of Tareq AL GHAZI and Luis Felipe MORENO-GODOY on 10-16-07; Fugitive Cancellation of AL GHAZI and MORENO-GODOY.
- Reference DEA-6 by G/S Dodd dated 10-18-07 under [REDACTED] Re: Post Arrest Statement of Luis Felipe MORENO-GODOY on 10-16-07.
- On October 16, 2007 at approximately 1:15 a.m. (all times reported as EST), S/A Archer, G/S Milione and I/A Barkett interviewed Tareq AL GHAZI following his arrest and during his extradition from Romania to the United States. I/A Barkett translated in Arabic for AL GHAZI even though AL GHAZI stated that he could speak and understand English fairly well.
- At the onset of this interview, S/A Archer, GS Milione and G/S Dodd played two videotaped excerpts of undercover meetings between [REDACTED] (CS1), [REDACTED] (CS2), [REDACTED] (CS3), AL GHAZI, Monzer AL KASSAR and Luis Felipe MORENO-GODOY at AL KASSAR's

11. Distribution: Division	12. Signature (Agent)  S/A John Archer	13. Date
District	14. Approved (Name and Title) Louis J. Milione Group Supervisor	15. Date
Other		

DEA Form - 6  
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residence in Marbella, Spain during March of 2007. S/A Archer informed AL GHAZI that not all of the information regarding the investigation had been revealed to the authorities in Romania but only enough information had been passed to ensure AL GHAZI and MORENO-GODOY's extradition from Romania to the United States. S/A Archer explained to AL GHAZI the pending charges against him in the United States.

6. At approximately 1:40 a.m., S/A Archer read AL GHAZI his rights as per Miranda via a DEA-13 card as witnessed by GS Milione. I/A Barkett translated each line from the Miranda card to AL GHAZI. AL GHAZI fully waived his rights and stated that he understood his rights. AL GHAZI then agreed to answer questions but stated that he first had questions that he wanted to ask of S/A Archer and GS Milione. AL GHAZI asked why CS1 had put him in this situation. AL GHAZI stated that he believed in peace. CS1 approached AL GHAZI approximately one and a half years ago. CS1 had located AL GHAZI in Lebanon, drank coffee and exchanged telephone numbers. CS1 and AL GHAZI communicated by telephone, met in person for approximately a year and talked regarding Abu ABBAS, Abu Jibril, the resistance and other political matters. CS1 came from the Bakaa Valley to meet with AL GHAZI in Saida. AL GHAZI's wife warned AL GHAZI about CS1 and was concerned about AL GHAZI getting into trouble. Approximately a year later, CS1 approached AL GHAZI about a weapons deal, specifically Kalashnikovs. CS1 had asked that AL KASSAR broker the deal at the request of a third party. AL GHAZI stated his apprehension to CS1 of utilizing AL KASSAR in the transaction because he was fearful that AL KASSAR would deprive AL GHAZI and CS1 with their due commission. AL GHAZI stated that anyone could buy legal weapons and that AL GHAZI was capable of acquiring the weapons without AL KASSAR. AL GHAZI stated that anyone could buy legal weapons and that AL GHAZI was capable of acquiring the weapons without AL KASSAR. CS1 told AL GHAZI that the deal would not likely go through unless AL KASSAR's name was attached to it because the third party knew AL KASSAR as a person who could get the transaction done.

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7. AL GHAZI spoke with AL KASSAR socially on the telephone. Oftentimes when AL KASSAR would call, AL GHAZI's wife would answer the phone and tell him that AL GHAZI was not available because she did not trust AL KASSAR. When AL GHAZI was in Warsaw, Poland in the 1990s and needed surgery for heart problems, AL KASSAR did not assist AL GHAZI. AL KASSAR was not in contact with AL GHAZI during this time (1993-1995) when AL GHAZI lived in Poland. AL GHAZI worked in the jewelry business while in Poland. AL GHAZI's wife contacted AL KASSAR asking assistance from him in the form of medical treatment and financial help. AL KASSAR began to call AL GHAZI and check on his condition. AL GHAZI was in a hospital and was told by doctors that he needed surgery on his back. AL KASSAR told AL GHAZI not to have the surgery but should instead travel to Spain to get a second opinion from doctors there. AL KASSAR assisted AL GHAZI in finding a doctor in Spain and around this time provided AL GHAZI with \$5,000. During 1996, AL GHAZI was at a low point in his life. AL GHAZI asked AL KASSAR for a few thousand dollars to assist him. AL KASSAR stated that he would contact AL GHAZI with regards to the money but never called him back. Later that year, AL GHAZI returned to Lebanon where his wife was located.
8. In Poland, AL GHAZI and AL KASSAR's associate, Zaki JALFI also assisted AL KASSAR in various capacities. AL KASSAR asked AL GHAZI and JALFI to store various documents of AL KASSAR in AL GHAZI's basement of his apartment. JALFI had two friends, Yousef ITANI and Jamal HAMDAN, visit him in Poland during 1992. During the week of their stay, AL GHAZI's apartment was broken into and of AL KASSAR's documents were taken. Polish police investigated the break-in and concluded that the burglary was conducted by people known to AL GHAZI. AL GHAZI believed that the documents were turned over to the Americans. AL GHAZI stated that JALFI knows everything about AL KASSAR. After the documents were taken from the apartment, AL KASSAR called and stated to AL GHAZI, "You destroyed me. This is a disaster to me." AL GHAZI said that the documents were many contracts to include weapons transactions that AL KASAR had brokered. AL GHAZI told AL KASSAR that he had nothing to do with the loss of the documents.

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9. After his arrest in Spain in the 1990s, AL KASSAR reached out to AL GHAZI in Poland regarding AL GHAZI testifying on his behalf. AL KASSAR knew that the Americans were using the documents taken from AL GHAZI's apartment in Poland. AL KASSAR said that AL GHAZI had to testify in support of AL KASSAR or else AL KASSAR would tell everyone that AL GHAZI had assisted the Americans and ruin AL GHAZI's reputation. AL GHAZI stated that he testified truthfully at AL KASSAR's trial in Spain.
10. AL GHAZI stated that AL KASSAR does not maintain a relationship with anyone unless he feels there is something that he can gain as a result of the relationship.
11. AL GHAZI returned to Poland and was contacted by AL KASSAR. AL KASSAR stated that he had good news for AL GHAZI. AL KASSAR stated that he would have a large sum of money for AL GHAZI. AL KASSAR stated that he had hosted the president of Somalia. AL KASSAR stated that the president had requested that AL KASSAR provide the shipping for the Somali government with rice, sugar and medical supplies that they wanted delivered. AL KASSAR stated that he had bought a boat for the voyage and had placed it under AL GHAZI's name. AL KASSAR expected that AL GHAZI would be on the boat when the goods were delivered to Somalia. AL KASSAR wanted AL GHAZI to coordinate the delivery of the goods and then sell the boat in Lebanon. AL KASSAR was going to pay AL GHAZI for his services. AL GHAZI said that he needed the money. AL GHAZI later told AL KASSAR that he was ready to make the trip. AL KASSAR informed AL GHAZI that AL KASSAR had used someone else on the boat and never paid AL GHAZI.
12. AL GHAZI was initially reluctant to admit that he had known AL KASSAR to be an international arms trafficker who was involved in smuggling weapons. S/A Archer asked what goods were on the ship that AL KASSAR had placed in AL GHAZI's name. AL GHAZI said that he was unaware of the products that were on the ship and AL GHAZI stated that he assumed that the goods were rice, sugar and medical supplies as he had been told by AL KASSAR. S/A Archer stated that he knew that AL GHAZI was a very smart man and knew of AL KASSAR's



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reputation with regards to arms trafficking. AL GHAZI stated that he needed money and was not interested in the product aboard the ship. S/A Archer asked if people normally would need to place a ship in someone else's name when they intended to transport legitimate cargo. S/A Archer observed that AL GHAZI appeared nervous and replied that he had felt that it was not his business to question AL KASSAR's intentions. AL KASSAR stated that he had known AL KASSAR for decades. When AL KASSAR traveled to Poland, AL GHAZI would pick him up and also ran errands for AL KASSAR. AL KASSAR did not trust anyone. AL GHAZI knew that AL KASSAR conducted business with foreign governments. Later, it became apparent to AL GHAZI that AL KASSAR was purchasing weapons for the Democratic Republic of Yemen.

13. AL GHAZI was aware that in 1976, Talat YACoub was a member of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF). In the 1980's, YACoub began earning a living supplying the northern tribes in Yemen with weapons. YACoub had asked the Yemenis to assist the PLF with money. The Yemenis stated that wanted to be supplied with weapons which YACoub agreed to do. One of the tribal leaders asked for Kalashnikovs. YACoub needed someone who knew about weapons and AL KASSAR was introduced into the transaction. AL GHAZI insisted that he had never been involved with any weapons deals with AL KASSAR or any weapons deals at all for that matter other than the weapons deal involved in this investigation.
14. AL GHAZI returned to talking about his involvement with CS1. AL GHAZI stated that CS1 showed him a copy of the end user certificate in approximately December of 2006. AL GHAZI contacted AL KASSAR by telephone and stated that he had a PLF acquaintance that had weapons paperwork from the Nicaraguan police. AL KASSAR asked if AL GHAZI knew him. AL GHAZI replied that he had known him for two years. AL KASSAR later told AL KASSAR that he would travel to Lebanon on December 26, 2006 and could meet with AL GHAZI and CS1. AL GHAZI said that he had not paid much attention to the items listed on the certificate. AL GHAZI was solely interested in making money on the transaction for CS1 and himself. AL GHAZI believed that he would make between 100,000 to 150,000 euros for assisting in brokering the

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weapons transaction. During CS1 and AL GHAZI's meeting with in Lebanon, AL KASSAR invited everyone to his residence in Spain in the near future to further discuss the weapons transaction.

15. After meeting with CS1 and AL KASSAR in Lebanon, AL GHAZI had several telephone calls with AL KASSAR during January of 2007 regarding the transaction. CS1 then started calling AL KASSAR directly about the weapons deal. During the last week in January of 2007, CS1 told AL GHAZI that they had to meet with AL KASSAR and the weapons buyers in Marbella in order to get the commission for the transaction.
16. Prior to meeting with CS1, CS2, CS3 and AL KASSAR in Marbella, Spain in February of 2007, AL GHAZI believed that CS1 was going to speak with AL KASSAR regarding their expected commission. Once in Spain, CS1 asked AL GHAZI to broach this subject with AL KASSAR.
17. Once CS2 and CS3 arrived in Marbella and were introduced to AL KASSAR, AL GHAZI learned from AL KASSAR that the weapons were not going to Nicaragua but were going to be diverted to a group in Colombia known as the FARC. The weapons were intended to be diverted to Suriname or another port. The conversation was initially in Spanish but was afterwards translated into Arabic by AL KASSAR. AL GHAZI stated that he did not initially know about the FARC until later when AL KASSAR and CS1 explained to him that the group was involved with drug trafficking and was at war with the United States. AL KASSAR and CS1 also informed him that CS2 and CS3 were associated with the FARC and were working for the FARC's behalf. AL GHAZI stated that he was shocked when he learned this information and that he felt he could not "pull to the left or to the right." AL GHAZI stated that he did not like the whole deal because initially everything was to be legal. AL GHAZI began to get upset because he knew that the weapons would be used against the United States and the Colombian government. CS1 and AL KASSAR explained many times what was being negotiated.
18. During this first meeting in Marbella, AL KASSAR saw the original end user certificate from Nicaragua. CS2 also produced another list

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of weapons that they wanted to purchase. AL GHAZI did not know the details of the weapons on this second document. AL GHAZI knew that the value of the weapons transaction totaled approximately 5-6 million euros. AL GHAZI was unaware of MORENO-GODOY's role in the transaction.

19. AL GHAZI stayed at AL KASSAR's residence for nearly two months in anticipation of the transaction. Once CS2 and CS3 returned at the end of March 2007, they provided him with 4,000 euros for his assistance with brokering the transaction. During the second meeting in Marbella, CS2 told AL KASSAR that he had wired 100,000 euros to him. On the second day, CS2 asked AL GHAZI to contact AL KASSAR and find out if AL KASSAR had received the money in his account. AL GHAZI called AL KASSAR and AL KASSAR insulted him. Thirty minutes later, AL KASSAR called and stated that he had received the money.
20. AL GHAZI knew that AL KASSAR had acquired a large amount wealth in a short amount of time but was unsure as to the source of the money other than the fact that AL KASSAR was involved in many deals. S/A Archer stated that certainly AL GHAZI would have heard rumors from mutual associates as to the money's origins. AL GHAZI stated that he had not heard any rumors and had not ever speculated about it. AL GHAZI stated that he had never known about any other illegal activities that AL KASSAR had been involved in other than this transaction which AL GHAZI knew to be illegal. AL GHAZI knew from the boat registration that AL KASSAR was sneaky in the manner by which AL KASSAR cut him out of the deal.
21. AL GHAZI recalled the discussions about CS2 and CS3 wanting to purchase C-4 and other explosives for the FARC to use in Colombia against the Americans. AL GHAZI heard the term "SAM" and knew that it meant Surface to Air Missile and that they were intended to be used against helicopters. AL GHAZI recalled conversations where AL KASSAR discussed which SAMs would be best for the FARC to shoot down American helicopters. AL GHAZI stated that he was "stuck between two fires." AL GHAZI stated that the two fires were AL KASSAR and CS1 who both wanted the transaction to be completed. S/A Archer



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told AL GHAZI that he could have left the conspiracy at any time and that he was no longer critical to complete the transaction. AL GHAZI stated that he would not have made any money had he not stayed with AL KASSAR and CS1.

22. AL GHAZI stated that if he were to return to Lebanon, he would be killed. AL GHAZI stated that AL KASSAR could have him and his family killed and that he greatly feared AL KASSAR. AL KASSAR would not use the AL YOUSEF brothers (Kazem AL YOUSEF and Nasem AL YOUSEF) to kill anyone but would use other people from Syria or Lebanon. AL KASSAR would also tell everyone that AL GHAZI was an informant for the Americans.
23. AL GHAZI stated that he is very concerned about the threat that AL KASSAR poses to him because of AL KASSAR's relationship to Syria, specifically with that of Syrian intelligence officials who always accompany him when he visits Lebanon and Syria.
24. AL GHAZI's wife has recently stated that she has received threatening phone calls stating that AL GHAZI gave AL KASSAR up to the Americans.
25. AL GHAZI believed that AL KASSAR was involved in an assassination plot against Elias AWAD. Yaser ARAFAT previously believed that AWAD was providing information about him to the Israelis. In 1983, ARAFAT was surrounded in Tripoli and AL KASSAR was assisting in providing a submarine to use to smuggle ARAFAT from Tripoli. AL KASSAR learned from the Syrian intelligence officials that AWAD had shared this information and AL KASSAR informed ARAFAT who ordered AWAD's assassination. Abu TAYEB from Office 17 was ordered to kill AWAD and an attempt was made.
26. AL KASSAR typically bought rifles for \$100 each and would sell them to the Yemenis for \$1500 apiece. The Yemenis would in turn sell them for \$3,000 each. AL KASSAR had a lot of wealth and power in regards to Yemen. AL KASSAR made \$100 - \$300 million with his deals with Yemen.

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27. S/A Archer asked AL GHAZI about his relationship with Samir KUNTAR. AL GHAZI admitted that he and AL KASSAR had talked during their meetings with CS1 that they were with KUNTAR prior to his 1977 operation against Israel that initiated his capture and confinement. AL GHAZI stated that not all of this was true but did not specify as to the details of the false information. AL GHAZI stated that he was employed in the financial division of the PLF and was not involved with the details of their operations.
28. AL GHAZI stated that while he was with AL KASSAR in Spain prior to his arrest in Romania, KUNTAR called AL KASSAR from an Israeli prison. AL KASSAR then passed the phone to AL GHAZI who also spoke with KUNTAR. AL KASSAR on another occasion contacted KUNTAR on a telephone which AL KASSAR stated had been smuggled into the prison.
29. S/A Archer asked if AL KASSAR believed in the ideology of Abu ABBAS and the PLF. AL GHAZI said that he did not think that AL KASSAR did and that he was just a friend of ABBAS. S/A Archer asked if AL KASSAR provided money to KUNTAR's family. AL GHAZI stated that he did not know if AL KASSAR provided money to KUNTAR but did not believe he did. S/A Archer restated AL GHAZI's words that AL KASSAR never maintained friendships unless there was something to be gained. S/A Archer asked what AL KASSAR could gain from his friendships with ABBAS and KUNTAR unless he (AL KASSAR) supported their ideology. AL GHAZI remarked that this was a good point.
30. AL GHAZI last saw ABBAS in 1989.
31. AL GHAZI knows Mohammed EL GHADBAN. AL GHAZI stated that he was unsure if EL GHADBAN played a role in the Achilles Lauro high-jacking in 1985. AL GHAZI does not like EL GHADBAN because EL GHADBAN had many women. S/A Archer stated that AL KASSAR did as well for that fact and AL GHAZI acknowledged this to also be true. AL GHAZI last saw EL GHADBAN in Tunis in 1984.
32. AL GHAZI was unaware of any history that AL KASSAR had trafficking narcotics.

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33. AL GHAZI stated that he was upset because he had been used as a way for the DEA to get to AL KASSAR. AL GHAZI stated that it wasn't fair because he did not even want to complete the transaction. S/A Archer said that AL GHAZI could have left the conspiracy at any time but continued to take actions to receive money for the proposed weapons transaction.
34. AL GHAZI continued to complain that he did not seek out CS1 and that CS1 had come to him and that he (AL GHAZI) had never done a weapons transaction before. S/A Archer stated that he had not challenged some of AL GHAZI's prior statements concerning AL GHAZI's history with arms transactions, particularly with AL KASSAR. S/A Archer stated that he knew of many instances of AL GHAZI's involvement with illicit weapons sales. S/A Archer asked AL GHAZI if he was familiar with the works of William Shakespeare and AL GHAZI stated that he was. S/A Archer stated that in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Marc Anthony delivered a speech following Caesar's assassination that included the line, "The evil that men do lives after them..." S/A Archer told AL GHAZI that the reason that the DEA introduced CS1 to him was because agents knew it would work because of the past relationship that AL GHAZI had with AL KASSAR, both personally and with arms trafficking. S/A Archer stated that the agents knew that AL KASSAR trusted AL GHAZI and that AL KASSAR and AL GHAZI would do what they had done before. AL GHAZI stated, "But I haven't done that with him in over fourteen years." S/A Archer asked if AL GHAZI was referring to an arms transaction and AL GHAZI replied affirmatively.
35. The interview concluded at approximately 7:15 a.m.

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